**Optimal Mitigation Policies in a Pandemic: Social Distancing and Working from Home. Jones, Philippon, Venkateswaran (2021)**

The paper uses an Epi model combined with household choice to study the incentives of private agents to avoid contacting the virus compared to planner solution, and the goal is to use such a model to quantify the trade-offs of “work from home” policy that could mitigate the pandemic. The virus avoidance way in the model is to “work from home”, which features a lower pandemic exposure at the expense of lower productivity and a mental utility cost. The models shows that there is a “wedge” between the private incentives of agents and the optimal solution – less mitigation in the decentralized solution.

Epi model: A standard SIR model, exposure to virus depends on consumption and labor choice.

Economic model: A standard optimizing household problem, with “work from home” technology that has a lower productivity and a negative utility cost, with one unit of labor produces one consumption good.